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Transparency and the Protection of Trade Secrets in 
the Fracturing World: The Case for Upfront 
Substantiation and Immediate Evaluation of 
Fracturing Fluid Trade Secret Claims in Louisiana 
INTRODUCTION 
“After years of talking about it, we’re finally poised to control our own 
energy future.”1 
 
Due to advances in technology, the future of the oil business within 
the United States is shining bright. Drilling companies now employ 
unconventional horizontal hydraulic fracturing2 to recover oil and natural 
gas from shale formations previously perceived to be economically 
unviable.3 The process of hydraulic fracturing spurs production in oil and 
gas wells by creating or restoring small fractures in the shale formation.4 
These fractures result from the high-pressure injection of a mixture of 
water, sand, and chemical additives.5 
Typically, oil and natural gas companies keep the exact identity of 
fracturing mixtures confidential, citing trade secret protection over what the 
companies perceive to be proprietary information.6 However, this 
confidentiality has led to public backlash.7 Several states have enacted 
mandatory disclosure requirements in response to the growing support for 
compelled transparency relating to the chemicals included in the mixtures.8 
By and large, these regulations still limit disclosure of what the public wants 
to access most—the exact identity and quantity of the chemicals that make up 
the additive portion of the fracturing fluid mixture.9 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by MARCUS ADAMS. 
 1. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013). 
 2. For the purposes of this comment, the terms “hydraulic fracturing” and 
“fracturing” will be used interchangeably to mean, “unconventional horizontal 
hydraulic fracturing.” 
 3. See Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process, FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org 
/hydraulic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydraulic-fracturing-process [http://perma.cc 
/QD34-W3CC] (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory 
Disclosure of Fracturing Water Composition, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 406 (2013). 
 7. See Unchecked Fracking Threatens Health, Water Supplies, NAT. RES. 
DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/energy/gasdrilling/ [http://perma.cc/758V- 
8TVM] (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
 8. See Hall, supra note 6, at 406–07. 
 9. See Fracking Disclosure Rules, ORRICK, http://reaction.orrick.com 
/reaction/ebooks/FrackingDisclosureRules/index.html [http://perma.cc/K296- 
M26C] (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
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In most cases, companies can cite trade secret protection to avoid 
disclosing this allegedly proprietary information.10 Even in mandatory 
disclosure states, overbroad trade secret protections often allow companies 
to avoid divulgence of specific chemical information. In addition, many of 
those states lack a process by which to evaluate trade secret claims unless 
challenged explicitly by a third party.11 Consequently, the newly enacted 
regulations have not appeased proponents of full, mandatory disclosure. 
Like many other states in the face of this public pressure, Louisiana 
enacted a mandatory disclosure regulation for the ingredients of fracturing 
fluid mixtures.12 Although a step in the right direction, Louisiana’s 
regulatory scheme nonetheless remains flawed, providing companies with 
a very general trade secret protection provision that lacks any form of 
immediate oversight.13 As a result, the regulation gives companies a clear 
path around actual disclosure. 
While a company surely has the right to protect its proprietary 
information from the inquiring eyes of its competitors, reasonable 
prudence demands that—in light of the potentially hazardous nature of the 
chemicals involved in fracturing—some process exists to evaluate trade 
secret claims at the time they are made, rather than only following a third 
party challenge. In order to protect this sensitive balance, Louisiana must 
adopt a comprehensive scheme requiring upfront justification for a trade 
secret claim and must develop an evaluation process to be carried out by a 
regulatory agency at the time each claim is made. To effectuate that 
process, legislators should look to analogous schemes in other states, such 
as the one adopted by Wyoming, for guidance on how to amend 
Louisiana’s current regulatory scheme. 
This comment commences with a foundational survey of trade secret 
law and a discussion of the hydraulic fracturing process, in Part I. Part II 
then discusses the sociopolitical movement pressing for mandatory 
disclosure of the compositional make-up of fracturing fluid mixtures. 
Next, Part III provides an analysis of the benefits and shortcomings of the 
current Louisiana regulation and its federal counterpart, the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxics Release Inventory 
(TRI) process, primarily focusing on the trade secret provisions of each. 
Part IV discusses the advantages of a more comprehensive process for 
trade secret claim evaluation, and Part V analyzes a model system in 
Wyoming. Lastly, Part VI outlines a proposed revision of Louisiana’s 
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. 
 11. See Matthew McFeeley, State Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Rules and 
Enforcement: A Comparison, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (July 2012), http: //www.nrdc 
.org/energy/files/Fracking-Disclosure-IB.pdf [http://perma.cc/BM7T-26ZL]. 
 12. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. xix, § 118 (2013). 
 13. Id. 
2016] TRANSPARENCY AND THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 429 
 
 
 
trade secret exemption regulation to balance the need for disclosure on the 
public’s end with the rights of companies to keep proprietary information 
confidential. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Trade Secrets 
A trade secret is any piece of economically valuable information that 
provides an entity with a competitive advantage over its competitors and 
for which the entity makes reasonable efforts to maintain confidentiality.14 
The actual origin of trade secret protection is somewhat debatable. 
Whether traced back to Roman law with the Actio Servi Corrupti,15 to the 
common law of nineteenth century England, or to somewhere in 
between16—it is clear that trade secrets law appeared in United States 
jurisprudence as early as 1868.17 
Today, all fifty states protect trade secrets, giving the original owner 
legal recourse against those who misappropriate the confidential 
information.18 The Congressional Research Service found, “Trade secret 
law protects secret, valuable business information from misappropriation 
by others. Subject matter ranging from marketing data to manufacturing 
know-how may be protected under the trade secret laws.”19 Whether it be 
the recipe for the Colonel’s fried chicken or the formula for WD-40, a 
trade secret is tremendously valuable to the company that invested the time 
and money to research and develop it. 
While the exact definition of what constitutes a trade secret is 
governed by state law and therefore differs in the precise language 
depending on the jurisdiction, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act’s (UTSA) 
definition is fundamental to most states’ laws. The UTSA has been 
                                                                                                             
 14. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1724 (10th ed. 2014); see also Roger M. 
Milgrim & Eric E. Bensen, Milgrim on Trade Secrets §1.01 (Matthew Bender & Co, 
2014). 
 15. A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, AN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN ROMAN LAW 1–9 
(Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1971); see also Alan Watson, Trade Secrets and Roman 
Law: The Myth Exploded, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 19 (1996) (for an argument 
against this theory). 
 16. See John Cavicchi, Trade Secrets Have A Long History, JORDA SECRETS 
(Oct. 25, 2007, 8:00 AM), http://www.jordasecrets.com/2007/10/jorda_on_trade_ 
secrets_have_a.html. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 1, 35 (2007). 
 19. John R. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv., R41391, The Role of Trade Secrets 
in Innovation Policy (2012). 
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adopted in forty-seven states, Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands.20 The Act defines trade secrets as 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process, that derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure 
or use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.21 
On a general level, society accepts trade secret protection as a valuable 
necessity. Even the most ardent supporters of mandatory disclosure for 
fracturing chemicals recognize the benefit of trade secret laws and respect 
the protection of a company’s proprietary information.22 The main 
justifications for protecting trade secrets are rooted in economics, 
philosophy, and populist opinion.23 
The economic argument in favor of protecting trade secrets may be 
the most important and persuasive: “[T]rade secrets relate to the economic 
value of information; it stands to reason that economic analysis is the 
appropriate way to justify the law.”24 Ideally, the legal protection of trade 
secrets means companies spend less money trying to protect their secrets 
and competitors likewise spend less money trying to acquire them.25 One 
would hope that money normally spent on protection and misappropriation 
would instead fund further research and development. Furthermore, the 
economic value gleaned from legal protection incentivizes innovation: 
“Trade secrets may establish incentives to innovate because they provide 
a mechanism for firms to capture the benefits of their inventions.”26 In 
other words, as long as oil and gas companies know that their hard-earned 
information will be kept secret and out of the hands of competitors, they 
will be more likely to keep investing in research, thus creating the potential 
for increased efficiency and safety.27 
                                                                                                             
 20. Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act 
.aspx?title=Trade+Secrets+Act [http://perma.cc/AJ4M-3NQK] (last visited Oct. 12, 
2014) At the time of publication, North Carolina, Massachusetts and New York have 
not adopted the United Trade Secrets Act. 
 21. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
 22. See McFeeley, supra note 11. 
 23. See Risch, supra note 18, at 26. 
 24. Id. at 26–28. 
 25. See id. at 26. 
 26. THOMAS, supra note 19. 
 27. See id.; See also Risch, supra note 18, at 26. 
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The second justification for trade secret protection revolves around the 
principle that the person who puts in the time and money to research, 
develop, or discover new information should be the one who owns it and, 
therefore, reaps the economic benefit.28 While that exact idea is not 
faithfully adhered to in modern trade secret law—trade secret protection 
is provided only to the information for which the owner expends effort to 
maintain secrecy—the notion manifests itself in the fact that trade secrets 
are protected on some level.29 
Finally, the populist argument for justifying trade secrets is based 
upon the rationale that what the majority wants, the majority should get. 
The majority’s clear desire for trade secret protection is illustrated by the 
legal protections enacted in every state.30 
B. Horizontal Hydraulic Fracturing 
Hydraulic fracturing entails the use of a mixture of “fluid and material 
to create or restore small fractures in a formation in order to stimulate 
production from new and existing oil and natural gas wells. This creates 
paths that increase the rate at which fluids can be produced from the 
reservoir formations.”31 In combination with horizontal drilling, operators 
of oil and natural gas wells undertake this process both to extend the life 
of active wells and to reach oil and natural gas surpluses previously 
thought to be unattainable.32 
Horizontal hydraulic fracturing is a two-step process. The operating 
company first drills a well “thousands of feet downward and then 
gradually angle[s] out horizontally through the shale deposit.”33 By 
branching the well out horizontally, the operator aims to reach the 
maximum expanse of the shale formation.34 Once the well is drilled, 
“[h]igh volumes of fracturing fluid are pumped deep into the well at 
pressures sufficient to create or restore the small fractures in the reservoir 
rock needed to make production possible.”35 The fracturing fluid is 
                                                                                                             
 28. See Risch, supra note 18, at 28–29. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 35. 
 31. FRACFOCUS, supra note 3. 
 32. Id.; See also Sorell E. Negro, The Thirst of Fracking: Regulating to Protect 
the Linchpin of the Natural Gas Boom, 77 ALB. L. REV. 725, 725–26 (2013). 
 33. Drilling for Natural Gas in the Marcellus and Utica Shales: Environmental 
Regulatory Basics, OHIO EPA (Jan. 2014), http://www.epa.ohio.gov/portals/0 
/general%20pdfs/generalshale711.pdf [http://perma.cc/5DW8-HNMN]. 
 34. See id. 
 35. FRACFOCUS, supra note 3. 
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composed of a mixture of up to 99.5% water and proppants,36 combined with 
a blend of chemical additives.37 The amount and type of chemicals used varies 
depending on the well.38 Chemical additives are typically used to prevent 
problems “such as bacterial build-up and the formation of scale, mineral 
deposits and rust” during the production of the oil or gas in the well.39 
Many types of chemical additives are used in these fluid mixtures, 
including acids, corrosion inhibiters, and biocides.40 While thousands of 
different possible chemicals may be used in the fracturing fluid, only a handful 
are used more routinely than others.41 Many of the chemicals commonly used 
in the additive portion of fracturing fluid mixtures are classified as hazardous 
pollutants regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act or Clean Air Act.42 They 
may also be found in the Occupational Safety & Health Administration 
(OSHA) database of regulated chemicals.43 
                                                                                                             
 36. “Proppants are sands or other granular substances injected into the formation 
to hold or “prop” open shale formation fractures created by hydraulic fracturing.” 
Hydraulic Fracturing Fluids, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jun. 2004), http://www.epa 
.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf. 
 37. See FRACFOCUS, supra note 3; See also Supplemental Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement On The Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory 
Program, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION (Sept. 7 2011), § 5.4.3, http: 
//www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf [http://perma.cc/FTT5-J5RJ]. 
 38. See Chemical Use In Hydraulic Fracturing, FRACFOCUS, http: 
//fracfocus.org/water-protection/drilling-usage [http://perma.cc/5GT2-H9BV] (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2014); See also Why Chemicals Are Used, FRACFOCUS, http: 
//fracfocus.org/chemical-use/why-chemicals-are-used [http://perma.cc/X5EM- 
WGH3] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 39. OHIO EPA, supra note 33. 
 40. See FRACFOCUS, Why Chemicals Are Used, supra note 38. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See FRACFOCUS, Chemicals Used in Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 38. 
 43. See What Chemicals Are Used, FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org/chemical-
use/what-chemicals-are-used [http://perma.cc/HT6S-963Z] (last visited Oct. 13, 
2014); See also OSHA Occupational Chemical Database, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & 
HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/chemicaldata/ [https://perma.cc/RWD5- 
8SEG] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
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Companies invest millions of dollars to research and develop the 
optimized mixtures for each shale formation.44 These complex mixtures 
arguably45 give the individual companies a competitive advantage, making 
them wary of other companies attempting to gain access to their investment.46 
II. THE PUSH FOR FULL MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
The push for mandatory disclosure turns on the fear that these fluid 
mixtures contain potentially hazardous chemicals. Proponents argue that 
the public has a right to know the identity of these chemicals due to their 
potentially hazardous effects on surrounding ecosystems and 
communities.47 Advocates of laws requiring the disclosure of chemicals 
used in fracturing fluid mixtures “maintain that public disclosure would 
allow for health professionals to better respond to medical emergencies 
involving human exposure to the chemicals; assist researchers in 
conducting health studies on shale gas production; and permit regulators 
and others to perform baseline water testing to track potential groundwater 
contamination if it occurs.”48 Growing apprehension over the possibility 
of subterranean water contamination, as well as above-ground exposure, 
has driven concerned citizens to speak out against the amount of 
information being withheld in states where hydraulic fracturing takes 
place.49 Much of the public anxiety arises from the nature of chemicals 
that are disclosed by companies, which in their own right “include some 
that, based mainly on occupational studies or high-level exposures in 
laboratory animals, have been shown to cause effects such as 
carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, reproductive toxicity, neurotoxicity or 
organ damage.”50 Such harmful effects only come as the result of an actual 
                                                                                                             
 44. See John D. Furlow & John R. Hays Jr., Disclosure With Protection of Trade 
Secrets Comes To The Hydraulic Fracturing Revolution, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY 
L. 289, 306 (2011). 
 45. The point is arguable because it is possible for companies to all independently 
develop and use the same product or information without the trade secret protection 
of that product being compromised and without any of the competing companies even 
knowing they are doing so. See Trade Secrets, WORKMAN NYDEGGER, 
http://www.wnlaw.com/ip-information/trade-secrets/[http://perma.cc/EQC5-JRWS] 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
 46. See Furlow & Hays Jr., supra note 44, at 306. 
 47. See McFeeley, supra note 11. 
 48. See Brandon J. Murrill & Adam Vann, Cong. Research Serv., R42461, 
Hydraulic Fracturing: Chemical Disclosure Requirements 1 (2012). 
 49. See Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing 
Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 8–9 (2011). 
 50. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation , supra note 37, at §5.4. 
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exposure;51 however, because the potential risk is so great, advocates for 
full disclosure question the risks associated with the chemical additives 
the companies are not willing to disclose. 
Meanwhile, some of the companies employing these mixtures have 
been adamant about protecting their alleged proprietary information.52 
Nine natural gas companies boldly refused to respond to a 2010 letter sent 
by the EPA requesting disclosure of the chemicals being used in their 
fracturing fluids for incorporation into a study of the potential impact and 
harm the fluids cause.53 Particularly, Halliburton—one of the more vocal 
opponents to the mandatory disclosure regulations—claimed that “it spent 
‘tens of millions of dollars’ across five years researching new fracturing 
fluids . . . [and] that public disclosure of its proprietary formulas could cost 
it $375 million.”54 In almost direct response to the argument that trade 
secret protection creates an incentive to innovate, “[c]ompanies also have 
argued that too much disclosure also could hinder efforts to develop new, 
less toxic fracturing chemicals. Oil and natural gas companies say they 
have no incentive to invest in research if their innovations will simply be 
given away.”55 
State legislatures have responded almost in unison to this push for 
mandatory disclosure by adopting disclosure regulations. At the time of 
publication of this comment, twenty-two states have adopted regulations 
regarding the disclosure of fracturing fluid chemicals.56 However, these 
regulations differ from state to state in terms of what material they actually 
require to be disclosed, and they are generally company friendly.57 Of the 
twenty-two states mandating disclosure, Wyoming leads the way with the 
most comprehensive requirements regarding trade secret protection.58 
The disclosure movement has also led to a collective response from 
the oil and gas industry by way of FracFocus, a website where “companies 
                                                                                                             
 51. Walter Tsou, The Big Secret? Fracking Fluids, PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. 
RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.psr.org/environment-and-health/environmental-health-
policy-institute/responses/the-big-secret-fracking-fluids.html [http://perma.cc/9FGV-
DCHR] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 52. Proprietary information is considered another term for trade secret. This 
information consists simply of that content which a company seeks to keep 
confidential. 
 53. See Wiseman, supra note 49, at 2. 
 54. Mike Soragahn, Hydraulic Fracturing: Two-thirds of Frack Disclosures 
Omit 'Secrets', E&E PUB. LLC (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.eenews.net 
/stories/1059970474 [http://perma.cc/B5HG-QVJA]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See ORRICK, supra note 9. 
 57. See Hall, supra note 6, at 406–07; Poe Legette et al., Trade Secrets and the 
Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing: Toward a Global Perspective—Pt 1, 4 INT’L 
ENERGY L. REV. 154, 158–67 (2013). 
 58. See id. 
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[can] voluntarily disclose the composition of fracturing fluid used anywhere 
in the United States on a well-by-well basis.”59 Two organizations, the 
Ground Water Protection Council and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact 
Commission, manage the website.60 The purpose of FracFocus is to enable 
direct disclosure of information from the companies themselves.61 While the 
concept behind the website is novel, the actual functioning of the site has its 
flaws. A recent study by the Harvard Law School gave the site “a failing grade 
as a disclosure tool,”62 underlining the often inaccurate or incomplete quality 
of FracFocus reports and the fact that the information can only be reviewed 
one well at a time.63 Moreover, concerns have arisen over discrepancies as to 
what was actually being claimed as a trade secret.64 
While the newly enacted disclosure regulations represent a step in the 
right direction, trade secret protections still obstruct necessary transparency to 
some extent. The oil and gas industry points to the EPA’s TRI as one 
regulation allowing companies to withhold the specific identity of chemicals 
they deem to qualify as trade secret information.65 Advocates of disclosure 
contend that states have given the oil and natural gas industry “special 
treatment” by not requiring any immediate oversight over trade secret claims 
while requiring such oversight in other areas.66 Indeed, both the federal and 
state levels provide similar regulations that require other industries to disclose 
proprietary information to regulators, which is then kept confidential from the 
public.67 While the industry stands behind the protections of the TRI, other 
federal laws—such as the Clean Air Act or the Food and Drug Act—do 
require the disclosure of proprietary information to regulatory officials who 
maintain confidentiality as to the general public.68 For example, Louisiana 
requires coal mining companies seeking to perform exploration or 
development processes to obtain a permit beforehand. As part of this 
                                                                                                             
 59. Hall, supra note 6, at 407. 
 60. About Us, FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org/welcome [http://perma.cc/9G2L 
-GK8Z] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See Katie Colaneri, Transparency about fracking chemicals remains elusive, 
STATEIMPACT (Aug. 7, 2014, 1:04 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2014 
/08/07/transparency-about-fracking-chemicals-remains-illusive/ [http://perma.cc  
/TWM7-Y64R]. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See Soragahn, supra note 54; See also infra Part III.B. 
 66. See McFeeley, supra note 11. 
 67. See Hall, supra note 6, at 422 n.174 (citing several federal laws such as 
the Clean Air Act, Food and Drug Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
as examples of laws requiring full disclosure of information with protection for 
trade secrets from public access). 
 68. See Hall, supra note 6, at 421–22. 
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permitting procedure, Louisiana protects from public view any confidential 
information submitted to the Office of Conservation.69 The oil and gas 
industry has generally opposed implementing similar processes for the 
exploration and development of oil and natural gas energy sources. 
That is not to say that the oil and gas industry is in full agreement on the 
issue of disclosure. One of the largest oilfield services companies, Baker 
Hughes, answered the call for full disclosure of its own accord, declaring that 
it would begin disclosing the identities of all of the ingredients contained in 
its fracturing fluids.70 Baker Hughes contends that by disclosing only the 
identities of the chemicals employed, and not the actual amounts used, the 
company can still protect its proprietary interests and promote “a balance that 
increases public trust while encouraging commercial innovation.”71 
Still, whether Baker Hughes actually discloses any of these chemical 
additives depends on the permission of the company’s customers.72 These 
clients may have a considerable stake in the matter of disclosure and may not, 
for their own business purposes, want a full release of information regarding 
potentially hazardous fluid ingredients. Although it is unlikely that the entire 
industry will follow in the footsteps of Baker Hughes, the company’s action 
can be interpreted as a sign that the industry is, at some level, open to the kind 
of transparency desired by proponents of disclosure.73 
III. THE CURRENT REGULATION 
Currently, both Louisiana and the EPA regulate chemical disclosure in 
regards to oil and natural gas drilling. While these regulations are worthwhile 
in theory, they ultimately prove to be futile against overbearing trade secret 
protections. 
                                                                                                             
 69. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:912 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:916 
(2014); See also Hall, supra note 6, at 422 n.174. 
 70. See Michael Winter, Major Firm To Disclose Fracking Chemicals, USA 
Today (Apr. 5, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2014/04/24 
/fracking-fluid-disclosure/8117133/ [http://perma.cc/D7QS-J3UN]. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Baker Hughes is not the only company in the oil and natural gas industry 
to support the disclosure movement. The CEO of Breitling Energy Corporation 
has been another vocal supporter of full disclosure. See Chris Faulkner, 
Regulator’s Have to Require Drillers to Come Clean on What’s In Fracking 
Fluids, THE PATRIOT NEWS (Dec. 24, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.pennlive.com 
/opinion/2014/12/regulators_have_to_require_dri.html [http://perma.cc  
/3TND-K5QX]. 
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A. Louisiana 
In accordance with the push for mandatory disclosure, Louisiana adopted 
a regulation requiring disclosure of the chemicals contained in the additive 
portion of the mixture used in wells no later than twenty days after the 
completion of “hydraulic fracturing stimulation operations.”74 Specific to the 
disclosure of chemicals used in the additive portion of the fluid, the regulation 
requires the operator to disclose a list of additives used, the specific trade name 
of each additive type, a list of chemical ingredients along with their associated 
Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers,75 and the maximum 
concentration of each respective ingredient.76 
While a cursory glance may lead the reader to believe the disclosure 
requirements are comprehensive and detailed, the regulation also includes a 
generous trade secret exemption. The operator may withhold the “specific 
identity of [any] chemical ingredient and the chemical ingredient’s associated 
CAS number” from a disclosure report if it deems that ingredient proprietary 
information.77 Thus, the operator will only need to disclose the “chemical 
family associated with the ingredient[,] . . . a statement that a claim of trade 
secret protection has been made . . . [and] the contact information of the entity 
claiming trade secret protection.”78 The regulation provides no express 
requirement that the claim be evaluated by a regulatory agency prior to an 
explicit challenge.79 The regulation also allows this disclosure report to be 
submitted through the FracFocus website or a similar service, rendering 
reporting to a Louisiana state regulatory agency unnecessary.80 Without a 
specific challenge to a company’s trade secret claim, the claim is presumed to 
be valid. 
The actual standard Louisiana requires a company to meet as to what 
constitutes a fracturing fluid trade secret, is promulgated in the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).81 In order for 
information to be considered confidential, a company must prove that it 
provides a competitive advantage and has not been disclosed to anyone other 
                                                                                                             
 74. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118 (2013). 
 75. CAS REGISTRY and CAS Registry Number FAQs, CAS, http://www 
.cas.org/content/chemical-substances/faqs [http://perma.cc/BM8T-7BVY] (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2014) A CAS number is a unique identifier for a chemical substance  
tied to an extensive registry. 
 76. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118 (2013). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118 (2013) (While Louisiana has 
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the state cites to the trade secret factors 
of the EPCRA in its fracking disclosure regulation). 
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than government personnel, employees of the company, or anyone bound by 
a confidentiality agreement.82 Essentially, this trade secret standard mimics 
the UTSA.83 While this standard is applied in the majority of states, the point 
of contention lies in its unsupervised application. 
Equally problematic, the only chemicals requiring disclosure under the 
regulation are those that are identified as hazardous by OSHA,84 meaning that 
they “pose a wide range of health hazards (such as irritation, sensitization, and 
carcinogenicity) and physical hazards (such as flammability, corrosion, and 
reactivity).”85 While the list of chemicals OSHA deems to be hazardous is 
extensive, whether it actually includes all dangerous chemicals is debatable.86 
To be identified as hazardous by OSHA, studies must show the chemical to 
be dangerous in a workplace setting; if no such study has been performed on 
the particular chemical, OSHA assumes it to be non-hazardous.87 
The lack of pre-treatment reporting presents another issue with the 
Louisiana regulation. While post-treatment reporting provides more accurate 
information as to what exactly was included in the fluid used,88 the regulation 
does not allow for pre-treatment baseline groundwater testing.89 The absence 
of actual oversight at the time the trade secret claims are made is also 
alarming. With such a broad protection afforded to these companies, many 
have great opportunity to exploit and circumvent actual disclosure of 
potentially harmful chemical additives.90 Thus, the regulation provides a false 
                                                                                                             
 82. 42 U.S.C. §11042(b) (2014). 
 83. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; while the exact language may 
differ, ultimately, the same premise is behind the standards. 
 84. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118 (2013). 
 85. Chemical Hazards and Toxic Substances, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & 
HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/hazardoustoxicsubstances/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q6YX-D92U] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 86. See McFeeley, supra note 11. 
 87. See id. 
 88. The actual makeup of the fluid mixture may be adapted during the process 
to better suit the well. 
 89. See Baseline Water Quality Testing ,  WATERSHED COUNCIL, 
http://www.watershedcouncil.org/learn/hydraulic-fracturing/baseline-testing/ 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2015); see also Groundwater Quality & Testing, FRACFOCUS, 
https://fracfocus.org/groundwater-protection/groundwater-quality-testing 
[https://perma.cc/7J9U-W47Z] (last visited Jan. 17, 2015) (baseline testing of the 
groundwater is a process whereby samples are taken from the nearby wells to 
determine the amount of chemicals in the water prior to the hydraulic fracturing 
process taking place. This data can then be used to compare to post-treatment 
testing to determine whether any contamination has occurred to the water as a  
result of the fracturing). 
 90. While far from perfect, it is worth noting that the current regulation in 
Louisiana exceeds its counterparts in other states by leaps and bounds. In 
particular, Utah and North Dakota have enacted regulations with little actual 
guidance of what must be disclosed beyond the most basic report to the FracFocus 
website. There is seemingly very little that is actually required to be disclosed, the 
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sense of transparency. Because the Louisiana regulation emulates the 
language and process of the TRI, it correspondingly mimics the same benefits 
and shortcomings. 
B. The EPCRA, TRI, and Louisiana 
Section 313 of the EPCRA establishes the TRI as “part of a new approach 
to environmental protection.”91 The creation of the TRI program came in 
response to growing public concern following disasters at chemical plants in 
India and West Virginia.92 Consequently, the EPA constructed the EPCRA to 
“support and promote emergency planning and to provide the public with 
information about releases of toxic chemicals in their community,”93 with the 
TRI tracking “the management of certain toxic chemicals that may pose a 
threat to human health and the environment. Facilities in the United States in 
different industry sectors94 must report annually how much of each chemical 
is released into the environment and/or managed through recycling, energy 
recovery, and treatment.”95 
The various states’ fracturing fluid disclosure regulations closely 
resemble the TRI. Generally speaking, the TRI program requires disclosure 
of chemicals “That cause [c]ancer or other chronic human health effects; 
Significant adverse acute human health effects; [and] Significant adverse 
environmental effects.”96 
                                                                                                             
reports to the FracFocus website are not mandated to be filed before sixty days 
post-treatment, and no oversight whatsoever concerning trade secret claims is 
afforded by the respective regulations. See Legette, supra note 56, at 159–60 (for 
a brief discussion on the Utah and North Dakota regulations). 
 91. Learn About The Toxics Release Inventory, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/learn-about-toxics-
release-inventory [http://perma.cc/XJ78-ZXKE] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 92. See id.; See also Allen Pusey, Dec. 3, 1984: Bhopal Chemical Leak Kills 
Thousands in India, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 1, 2012, 6:50 AM), http://www 
.abajournal.com/magazine/article/dec._3_1984_bhopal_chemical_leak_kills_tho
usands_in_india/ [http://perma.cc/V7A6-8P7W] (discussing the plant leak in 
India which resulted in thousands of deaths as a result of chemical exposure); Ben 
A. Franklin, Toxic Cloud Leaks At Carbide Plant In West Virginia, NY TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/12/us/toxic-cloud-leaks-at-
carbide-plant-in-west-virginia.html [http://perma.cc/3Q9F-4U49] (discussing the 
plant leak in West Virginia which exposed hundreds of nearby residents to  
potentially harmful chemicals). 
 93. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 91. 
 94. Id. (“[F]acilities that report to TRI are typically larger facilities involved 
in manufacturing, metal mining, electric power generation, chemical 
manufacturing and hazardous waste treatment . . . .”). 
 95. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 91. 
 96. Id. 
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Louisiana could do worse than trying to replicate the established system 
of the TRI. Instead of simply creating standards and rules on how to handle 
these hazardous materials, a process like the TRI “creates a strong incentive 
for companies to improve environmental performance.”97 Requiring 
disclosure to the EPA of materials not protected as trade secrets also makes 
this information publically available. As such, public scrutiny increases and 
companies are encouraged to research and develop safer alternatives. The 
level of disclosure required also places the burden on the companies to show 
that what they are claiming is indeed a trade secret. 
Studies show that the level of substantiation required for the TRI serves 
as a deterrent to companies making trade secret claims and vastly reduces the 
amount of claims actually made.98 It would be reasonable to assume that this 
benefit applies equally to the Louisiana regulation. However, while the TRI 
records reflect only seven claims made out of thousands of reports over the 
course of a year,99 the results of a quick search for Louisiana wells on 
FracFocus shows proprietary information being withheld from the first twenty 
wells listed.100 The EPA has not required participants of the oil and gas 
extraction industry to report to the TRI, stating that “most of the information 
required under TRI is already reported by producers to state agencies that 
make it publicly available. Also, TRI reporting from the hundreds of 
thousands of oil and gas sites would overwhelm the existing EPA reporting 
system.”101 
Despite its noted benefits, the TRI system is not without its shortcomings. 
For instance, the EPCRA allows companies to claim trade secret protection 
when filing their TRI disclosure reports. However, only the exact identity of 
the chemical may be hidden; the company must provide the generic class or 
family for each chemical.102 Moreover, no established process exists for 
evaluating the trade secret claims at the time they are made. Although any 
third party may challenge a trade secret claim, the EPA neither reviews the 
                                                                                                             
 97. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-08/documents 
/epcra_fact_sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/9BTU-LB8Z] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 98. See Sheila A. Ferguson, et al., Influence of CBI Requirements on TSCA 
Implementation, Hampshire Research Associates, Inc. (March 1992); Richard 
Denison, Worse than we thought: Decades of out-of-control CBI claims under 
TSCA, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND (Feb. 12, 2010), http://blogs.edf.org/health 
/2010/02/12/worse-than-we-thought-decades-of-out-of-control-cbi-claims-under 
-tsca/ [http://perma.cc/LKF8-33M2]. 
 99. Denison, supra note 98. 
 100. Find a Well, FRACFOCUS, http://www.fracfocusdata.org/DisclosureSearch 
/SearchResults.aspx [http://perma.cc/MG26-TAKR] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 101. Chemicals & Public Disclosure, FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org 
/chemical-use/chemicals-public-disclosure [http://perma.cc/8NYP-XLEY] (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 102. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 97. 
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claim nor rules on its validity unless petitioned to do so,103 meaning that no 
oversight exists absent an explicit challenge of the claim. 
IV. THE CASE FOR UPFRONT SUBSTANTIATION AND AN IMMEDIATE 
EVALUATION PROCESS OF TRADE SECRET CLAIMS 
At present, it is simply too easy for a company to make a claim that 
information is a trade secret and effectively dodge regulation. With little 
provision for affirmative review procedures, the present system bears the risk 
of a proliferation of overbroad claims. A new system must be put into effect 
to serve the best interests of community health, environmental protection, and 
the oil and gas industry alike. 
A. No Oversight 
The major issue with the current system is the absence of oversight 
reviewing what companies actually claim to be proprietary information 
notwithstanding explicit challenge after the fact. In an industry frequently 
using potentially harmful chemicals on such a grand scale, the lack of 
oversight becomes a fundamental problem. Even absent ill intent on the part 
of the companies, over-claiming trade secret protection on these disclosure 
reports could result from simple error. Nonetheless, without a process to 
review claims at the time they are made, companies may—intentionally or 
unintentionally—claim protection for information that should not qualify as a 
trade secret.104 
The possibility for intentionally overbroad claims, however, becomes 
particularly evident when dealing with the hydraulic fracturing process. 
Because of the heightened public scrutiny and potential liability tied to the 
hazardous chemicals in play, companies may decide it easier to “over-claim 
trade secrets to escape responsibility” since the lack of oversight implicitly 
allows it.105 With a process in place to evaluate these claims at the time they 
are made, this concern will be effectively put to rest. Instead, under the present 
regulation, these companies essentially get a “free pass to avoid disclosure 
requirements when a company claims trade secrets are involved.”106 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id. 
 104. Comments On Proposed 20 AAC 25.283 - Fracing, U. TEX. REG. OVERSIGHT 
GRP. (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.utexas.edu/law/wp/wp-content/uploads/centers 
/energy/UTROG-Comment-on-AOGCC-Rules.pdf. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See McFeeley, supra note 11. 
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B. Ability to Challenge Claims 
To mitigate the potential for overbroad claims, the state must set up an 
initial review process to be conducted at the time that claims are made. Under 
this proposed system, an automatic “challenge” of the claim by a state 
regulatory agency will take place, which will lead to less trepidation on the 
part of the public regarding whether companies are making legitimate trade 
secret claims. The approval of the state agency will, in turn, decrease the 
public’s desire to bring third party challenges. Both the state and third parties 
will be more able to challenge trade secret claims if oil and natural gas 
companies disclose to the regulatory agency the information they believe to 
be protected.107 In the case where the claim is still challenged by a third party, 
the proposed scheme will lead to a more efficient process because the state 
will already have the information necessary to make the decision; ruling on 
the challenge will be as simple as conducting a de novo review of the 
information by the state agency. 
C. Transparency 
In the case of hydraulic fracturing, the industry’s ideal response to 
advocates for disclosure will be to promote transparency for transparency’s 
sake. While the hydraulic fracturing boom has led to a figurative 
“boogeyman” for opponents of the oil and gas industry to publicly attack, no 
significant studies actually evidence severe environmental defects stemming 
from the fracturing process.108 This void does not suggest the nonexistence of 
potential harm—the use of thousands of gallons of potentially hazardous 
chemicals could cause significant damage in the case that some mishap 
occurs.109 Still, the exaggerated risks of fracturing in public forums means that 
advocating for broader disclosure is in the industry’s best interest.110 A 
comprehensive system requiring full disclosure of the chemical identities used 
in fracturing will “defang the boogeyman,” as one drilling company CEO has 
so eloquently stated.111 
                                                                                                             
 107. See Hall, supra note 6, at 418. 
 108. Chris Faulkner, FRACKING: The Future is Transparency, BREITLING 
ENERGY (Jun. 30, 2014), http://www.breitlingenergy.com/fracking-future- 
transparency-drill/ [http://perma.cc/53WF-4S37]. 
 109. See Seamus McGraw, Pennsylvania Fracking Accident: What Went 
Wrong, POPULAR MECHANICS (Apr. 21, 2011 1:00 PM), http://www.popular 
mechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/pennsylvania-fracking-accident-
what-went-wrong-5598621 (describing one incident that occurred in 
Pennsylvania, where a leak in the well led to “thousands of gallons of chemical  
laced water flowing out beyond its protective berms”). 
 110. Faulkner, supra note 108. 
 111. Id. 
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Congress has determined that “[e]very American has the right to know 
the chemicals to which they may be exposed in their daily living.”112 While 
the EPA has not extended the TRI specifically to the oil and gas industry—
instead allowing the states to sidestep the EPCRA with their own 
regulations for fracturing fluid disclosures—the intent behind the EPCRA 
should be read into these state regulations. Congress established the 
EPCRA, in part, to increase public awareness of the chemicals used and 
potentially released into the environment.113 By enacting the EPCRA, 
Congress secured the public’s right to know the identity of the hazardous 
and toxic substances being used in their vicinity. 
That policy falls in line with Justice Brandeis’s famous line, “sunlight 
is said to be the best of disinfectants.”114 In Justice Brandeis’s opinion, 
great benefits arise from transparency as “[p]ublicity is justly commended 
as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.”115 Justice Brandeis opined 
that complete transparency in business dealings would benefit society as a 
whole.116 While his ultimate objective of full and absolute disclosure with 
no protected or confidential information, overreaches the present proposal, 
the underlying idea remains persuasive. The more transparent oil and gas 
companies become in disclosing what chemicals they are using in 
hydraulic fracturing treatment, the less adamant the calls of industry 
detractors will be. 
D. Wait-and-See Approach 
Put simply, no adequate rationale explains why a disclosure regulation 
should take a “wait-and-see” approach to trade secret claims. Any 
argument favoring a system that permits trade secret claims to stand 
without oversight must logically succumb to the argument for a system 
mandating oversight. When it comes to balancing the potential health and 
safety of the public with the monetary desires of the oil and gas industry, 
the public’s well-being must always triumph. 
The protection of the public brings to the forefront the precautionary 
principle, which demands that, “[w]hen an activity raises threats of harm 
to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be 
                                                                                                             
 112. Learn About Your Right to Know, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www 
.epa.gov/epahome/r2k.htm [http://perma.cc/V3JP-3KAC] (last visited Oct. 13, 
2014). 
 113. Id. 
 114. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS 
USE IT 92 (Frederick A. Stokes Co. 8th ed. 1932) Other People’s Money is often 
cited as a source for any scholar discussing transparency in the business industry 
as well as in the government. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
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taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established 
scientifically.”117 Under this principle, a society valuing transparency calls for 
a regulation requiring full disclosure despite the lack of studies proving severe 
harm directly resulting from fracturing or the chemicals used during 
treatment. 
V. WYOMING AS AN EXAMPLE 
In attempting to solve the conundrum of what level of disclosure should 
be required for fracturing fluid chemicals, a balance of the interests of the 
public at large and that of the companies must be met. While the task is 
certainly daunting, a model process is already in place in Wyoming. As such, 
Louisiana can look to Wyoming as an example that it should emulate.118 
In 2010, Wyoming became the first state to enact a mandatory disclosure 
regulation for hydraulic fracturing fluid chemicals.119 Wyoming’s regulation 
is different from its Louisiana counterpart in four ways: (1) It requires 
companies to make both pre- and post-treatment reports; (2) The chemicals 
for which reporting is required are not limited to only those regulated by 
OSHA; (3) The companies are required to disclose the identity of the 
chemicals beyond just their generic chemical families; and (4) The regulation 
requires that a trade secret claim be evaluated at the time it is made.120 
While the Louisiana regulation only requires a company to make a 
disclosure report within twenty days after the end of the hydraulic fracturing 
process, Wyoming requires this report be made both before and after the 
treatment process.121 Reporting prior to the treatment process allows for 
baseline groundwater testing, which in turn aids in evaluating for 
contamination.122 Wyoming also requires the companies to report post-
treatment, which thereby increases the accuracy of the reports as the actual 
fluid mixtures may be altered during the fracturing process.123 Companies are 
required to give the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission 
(WOGCC) a complete list of the chemicals that they plan to use for the 
specific well in the pre-treatment report and then supplement that information 
with the actual amount of each chemical used in the post-treatment report.124 
                                                                                                             
 117. Precautionary Principle, SCIENCE & ENVT’L HEALTH NETWORK (Jan. 26, 
1998), http://www.sehn.org/wing.html [http://perma.cc/ET23-QSJT]. 
 118. Wyoming is currently the only state carrying out oversight at the level of 
implementation necessary in Louisiana and therefore provides the ideal 
foundation for the proposed scheme. 
 119. See Hall, supra note 6, at 406. 
 120. tit. 55, ch. 3, WYO. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis Dec 2012). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Hall, supra note 6, at 424. 
 123. tit. 55, ch. 3, WYO. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis Dec 2012). 
 124. Id.; See also Legette, supra note 56, at 159. 
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At the time the report is made, the “party claiming trade secret 
protection must justify and document the nature and extent of the 
proprietary information.”125 The WOGCC then compares what the 
company claims to be protected proprietary information to the trade secret 
standard set forth in the Wyoming Public Records Act (WPRA) and makes 
a determination as to whether the information is indeed a trade secret 
deserving protection.126 If the WOGCC agrees with the company that the 
information is indeed a trade secret, the information is then kept on record 
and deemed confidential by the agency.127 Although the information is 
now under the state’s control, it is under no circumstances subject to a 
public records request.128 
The standard for qualifying a trade secret under the WPRA is more 
exclusive than the Louisiana standard. Recently, this question—
specifically regarding whether the chemical identities of the fracturing 
fluid formulas constituted a trade secret—came before the Wyoming 
Supreme Court.129 The Court determined that the WPRA establishes a 
more narrow definition of trade secrets than does the UTSA.130 Thus, 
under the WPRA, a trade secret “is a secret, commercially valuable plan, 
formula, [or] process . . . that is used for the making, preparing, 
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to 
be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort, with a direct 
relationship between the trade secret and the productive process.”131 
According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, this definition is designed to 
be more in line with the intent behind the WPRA and, following in the 
footsteps of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), prefers transparency 
over opacity in most cases.132 However, Wyoming’s definition may not be 
the most appropriate for the regulation of fracturing fluids. Whether 
individual chemical identities would be considered trade secrets under the 
WPRA definition is unclear133 so its use falls short of perfect in a situation 
seeking to protect such information while still requiring its disclosure. 
In theory, the situation created by the Wyoming statute is ideal—the 
public gets the transparency they want through full disclosure to a 
regulatory agency, while the companies get the deserved protection for 
                                                                                                             
 125. See Brandon J. Murrill & Adam Vann, Cong. Research Serv., R42461, 
Hydraulic Fracturing: Chemical Disclosure Requirements 9 n.62 (2012). 
 126. See id. 
 127. tit. 55, ch. 3, WYO. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis Dec 2012). 
 128. WYO. STAT. ANN. §16-4-203(d)(v). 
 129. See Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyoming Oil & Gas 
Conservation Comm’n, 320 P.3d 222 (2014). 
 130. See id. at 233. 
 131. Id. at 234. 
 132. See id. at 231. 
 133. See id. at 234–35. 
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their proprietary information. Still, this statute is not without its own faults. 
Questions remain, however, as to how lenient the trade secret standard 
being applied by the state agency is and how much assessment is actually 
going into these trade secret claims in practice.134 Another problem 
persists regarding the burden imposed on the state agency as a result of 
increased resource expenditure.135 
VI. SOLUTION 
The solution to the glaring hole in the Louisiana fracturing fluid 
disclosure regulation is clear: Louisiana must adopt a comprehensive 
scheme similar to that enacted in Wyoming. Instead of a general, post-
treatment report provided through the FracFocus website, Louisiana 
should require companies to make both pre- and post-treatment reports to 
a state regulatory agency. The pre-treatment report will contain full 
disclosure of every chemical ingredient a company believes it will use for 
that well, while the post-treatment report should include what chemicals 
were actually used in the fluid, as well as the concentration of each 
individual chemical. Companies will still be able to claim trade secret 
protection for proprietary information, since Louisiana protects trade 
secret information from public records requests.136 Instead of adopting an 
approach that only questions and evaluates trade secret claims if they are 
explicitly challenged, the state regulatory agency should automatically 
assess claims at the time they are made. The trade secret standard applied 
to disclosures should remain the same, as the current standard is well 
recognized by most states and federal agencies. 
The Louisiana Office of Conservation will assume the responsibility 
of assessing fracturing fluid trade secret claims. Currently, the Office of 
Conservation is “charged with . . . [the] statutory responsibility to regulate 
the exploration and production of oil, gas and other hydrocarbons and 
lignite . . . and to protect public safety and the environment from oilfield 
waste, including regulation of underground injection and disposal 
practices.”137 The oversight of hydraulic fracturing fluid trade secret 
                                                                                                             
 134. Id. at 222. 
 135. See Hall, supra note 6, at 416; See also Lynda Edwards, Audit: Louisiana 
Fails To Plug And Police Abandoned Wells, THE ADVERTISER (Jun. 3, 2014 9:21 
PM), http://www.theadvertiser.com/story/news/local/louisiana/2014/06/03/audit-
louisiana-fails-plug-police-abandoned-wells/9938581/ [http://perma.cc/KW8R-
UT6S] (providing a brief summary of the current understaffing issues facing the  
Louisiana Office of Conservation). 
 136. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:3.2 (2014). 
 137. Office of Conservation, DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://dnr.louisiana.gov 
/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=46 [http://perma.cc/2MGQ- 
5ER2] (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
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claims thus naturally falls under the Office of Conservation’s charge, as it 
is in the purview of the Office’s other duties and activities. 
This process will limit the frequency of both intentional and 
unintentional frivolous claims. From a policy perspective, immediate 
evaluation surpasses the “wait-and-see” approach of withholding claim 
evaluation until a third party challenge. A proactive approach effectively 
eliminates mistaken trade secret claims that occur on the companies’ end 
and serves as a surefire deterrent to any company attempting to 
intentionally circumvent the system. 
Arguments against instituting this kind of comprehensive agency 
review in Louisiana center on the overall cost on state resources, the 
increased cost to oil and gas companies, and the possibility of inept, rushed 
processing by the overburdened state agency. Colorado is one state that 
has been vocal about its doubts concerning a fracturing regulation that 
mandates immediate oversight of trade secret claims. State leaders cited 
budget and resource concerns, along with fears of the heightened risk of 
inadvertent disclosure of protected information innately flowing from the 
increased number of eyes interfacing with the information.138 
While it is true that the allocation of more state resources to the Office 
of Conservation will be necessary, funding can be amassed by requiring 
companies who wish to file a trade secret claim to pay a specified fee. 
Although oil and natural gas companies may balk at paying a fee, the 
public interests must be protected over the monetary interests of 
companies who already benefit financially from hydraulic fracturing. 
Furthermore, the risk of exposure of trade secret information does not 
compel rejection of the system, as legal repercussions are in place to 
punish perpetrators and prevent such violations. While these arguments 
are facially legitimate, the deterrent effect of this system against both 
intentional misuse of trade secret protection by companies and 
unintentional mistakes must be prioritized on the grounds that the 
hydraulic fracturing process entails the use of thousands of gallons of 
potentially hazardous chemicals. 
CONCLUSION 
The rise of the horizontal hydraulic fracturing process promises great 
economic gains for the future. Nevertheless, it is clear that the increased 
use of this process brings with it an abundance of the potentially hazardous 
chemicals inherently implicated therein. For this reason, disclosure of the 
                                                                                                             
 138. See Hall, supra note 6, at 416; Legette, supra note 56, at 158; Order 
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actual identity of the chemicals used is necessary. However, such 
disclosure should not come at the expense of the companies who have 
invested millions of dollars and countless hours into developing the most 
efficient and proper mixtures for each well. Although Louisiana has 
attempted to take a step toward transparency regarding hydraulic 
fracturing fluid ingredients, a loophole nonetheless persists. Under the 
present system, companies can too easily circumvent actual disclosure of 
the chemicals and corresponding concentrations that they use for the 
fracturing fluid. While striking a balance between company interests and 
the level of disclosure sought by public advocates is a delicate task, 
Wyoming’s existing scheme furnishes an efficacious model for addressing 
this issue. By adopting a comprehensive scheme similar to Wyoming’s, 
Louisiana can satisfy proponents of disclosure while still keeping the 
proprietary information of the companies confidential. 
 
Marcus Adams 
 
                                                                                                             
  J.D., 2016, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
I would like to thank Professor Keith Hall for providing his oil and gas expertise 
and direction on this comment as well as Professor Lee Ann Lockridge for 
providing her insight on trade secret law and further guidance on this topic. I 
would also like to give thanks to my fellow editors of the LSU Journal of Energy 
Law & Resources. I also owe a special thanks to Tom Crowley for providing his 
invaluable guidance and direction. Finally, I owe immense gratitude to my 
parents, Robin and Christena and the amazing Ashley Brumit for their incredible 
amount of patience and encouragement throughout this process. 
